Forever For All
A lengthy read, but it does definitely worth the time.
It's indeed a thoroughly well written and thought-provoking book, with lots of interesting and exciting ideas on different — sometimes peculiar — subjects, albeit scattered unevenly through the chapters.
[MENTION=285]Unknown[/MENTION]
The two major divisions of opinions are the reductionist and the nonreductionist views, as discussed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons;[2] a short summary will be useful here. For a reductionist, the question of the survival or nonsurvival of P1 in P2 is reducible to certain other facts about P1 and P2 that can be described in an im-personal way. Such facts, for example, may include the different psychological and physical characteristics of both P1 and P2 and the process involved (if applicable) in the formation or development of P2 out of P1.
It should be clear that physical characteristics of a person can be described in an impersonal way, for example, by resorting to physics, if we think of a person as amounting to a collection of particles in ...
Interchangeability.
Two persons, I submit, should be considered one and the same if they can be said to experience the same events at the conscious level. Clearly this will happen if the two could be in the same quantum state, for then everything about them must be repeated as far as we know.
پیوند دگرگزین:
http://www.foreverforall.org/pdfs/foreverforall.pdf
پارسیگر
.Unexpected places give you unexpected returns